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CAN STATE-SPONSORED RELIGIOUS
SYMBOLS PROMOTE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY?
THOMAS C. BERGt
The title of this conference panel raises the question,
"Cultural or Religious? Understanding Symbols in Public Places."
I will make some remarks about that issue, but I would like
primarily to frame a different question: "Can public, that is
state-sponsored, religious symbols promote religious liberty?"
Let me explain the question. I followed from afar the
litigation in Lautsi v. Italy' over the display of crucifixes in
Italian state schools. I also have spent a number of years
studying the United States Supreme Court's erratic efforts to
distinguish between permissible and impermissible government
religious symbols and statements. In Lautsi, of course, the
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights upheld
the Italian schools' display of crucifixes. Somewhat differently,
our Supreme Court has upheld state-sponsored displays of
symbols such as cr~ches or menorahs and of religious texts such
as the Ten Commandments, but only outside the school setting,
and only if they are accompanied by other elements giving the
overall display a secular message.2 In both instances, the high
courts in question found that the displays did not interfere with
religious liberty.
t James L. Oberstar Professor of Law and Public Policy, University of St.
Thomas School of Law (Minnesota). Thanks to Mark Movsesian and Marc
DeGirolami for the invitation to speak in Rome at the St. Johns/LUMSA conference
on State-Sponsored Religious Symbols, to symposium participants for stimulating
conversation, and to Amy Edwall and Nicole Swisher for helpful research assistance.
1 Lautsi v. Italy, No. 30814/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 18, 2011), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104040.
2 McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 857, 881 (2005) (invalidating
Decalogue display tainted by earlier display of Decalogue standing alone); Van
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691-92 (2005) (approving Decalogue display with
other historic/civic monuments); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989) (approving menorah with Christmas tree but
invalidating standalone crache); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984)
(approving crche with secular Christmas symbols); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,
42 (1980) (invalidating posting of Decalogue in public school classrooms).
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But I believe that if such displays are to be justified in public
argument, they need a stronger defense than merely that they
can co-exist with religious liberty. After all, they can have
negative effects: They can coerce or at least alienate people who
do not share the favored religion, especially children in a
schoolroom, and they can create social conflict over which
religion(s) receive the state's acknowledgment. In that light, the
justification for them would be much stronger if they do not
merely coexist with religious liberty but can actually promote it.
That affirmative case may not be required as a matter of positive
law. To me, the Grand Chamber seems correct in concluding
that, given the variety of church-state arrangements among
European nations, Europe's human-rights tradition does not
have a sufficient consensus to prohibit state-sponsored religious
displays. But the affirmative case for such displays is needed, I
think, if they are to be defended as a matter of state policy.
In this Article, therefore, I examine the question and offer
some ways in which state-sponsored religious symbols can
actually support a vigorous conception of religious liberty. I then
acknowledge some of the problems with such official displays and
briefly suggest ways in which the vigorous conception of religious
liberty can be recognized and promoted without them.
I. How OFFICIAL SYMBOLS MIGHT SUPPORT RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
I begin my Article with two texts, one European and one
American. The European text is from an earlier ruling in Lautsi:
the 2006 opinion of Italy's Consiglio di Stato, or Supreme
Administrative Court. In holding the crucifix displays
permissible, that court said:
[I]n Italy the crucifix is capable of expressing, symbolically of
course, but appropriately, the religious origin of those values-
tolerance, mutual respect, valorisation of the person,
affirmation of one's rights, consideration for one's freedom, the
autonomy of one's moral conscience vis-A-vis authority, human
solidarity and the refusal of any form of discrimination-which
characterise Italian civilisation.... The reference, via the
crucifix, to the religious origin of these values and their full and
complete correspondence with Christian teachings accordingly
makes plain the transcendent sources of the values concerned,
without calling into question, rather indeed confirming the
autonomy of the temporal power vis-A-vis the spiritual power
24
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(but not their opposition, implicit in an ideological
interpretation of secularism which has no equivalent in the
Constitution) . . . .3
The American text comes from fifty years earlier: A
statement by a committee of the U.S. Congress explaining why
that legislature had added the phrase "under God" to the official
text of the Pledge of Allegiance to the American flag. From the
Pledge's creation in 1892, public schoolchildren and other
Americans recited it to declare allegiance to the flag "and to the
Republic for which it stands one Nation indivisible, with Liberty
and Justice for all."4 But in 1954, at the height of the Cold War
and in response to advocacy by President Eisenhower and several
prominent clergymen, Congress amended the text to read "one
Nation under God, indivisible."' The relevant congressional
committee report explained the change on the ground, among
others, that it would more clearly state the foundation of
American liberties:
At this moment of our history the principles underlying our
American Government and the American way of life are under
attack by a system whose philosophy is at direct odds with our
own. [O]ur American Government is founded on the concept of
the individuality and the dignity of the human being.
Underlying this concept is the belief that the human person is
important because he was created by God and endowed by Him
with certain inalienable rights which no civil authority may
usurp.... [The inclusion of "under God" in the Pledge] would
serve to deny the atheistic and materialistic concepts of
communism with its attendant subservience of the individual.
These two texts have obvious differences. One is European,
the other American; one concerns a symbol specifically of
Christianity, the other a more generic piece of religious language;
and one appeared recently while the other dates back to the less
religiously pluralistic America of the Cold War. But the two
texts share a thesis, broadly speaking. They claim that certain
I See Lautsi, No. 30814/06, 16, at 8-9 (quoting Consiglio di Stato).
4 The Pledge of Allegiance and Our Flag of the United States: Their History and
Meaning, UNITED STATES DISTRIcT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA,
http://www.wvsd.uscourts.gov/outreach/Pledge.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2013).
6 Pledge of Allegiance, Pub. L. No. 396, 56 Stat. 380 (1954).
6 H.R. REP. No. 83-1693, at 1-2 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339,
2340.
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religious expression by the government, including display of
religious symbols, is not merely tolerably consistent with
religious liberty, but can actually support it, along with other
human rights. This Article will explore that thesis in greater
detail, including both the arguments for it and the shortcomings
in it.
The two texts share another feature: Neither was adopted
by the relevant court of last resort as the basis for justifying the
official religious expression in question. The Italian tribunal's
defense of Christianity as a key ground of religious freedom-
indeed, as a key ground of the "autonomy of the temporal state,"
or Italian laicita-was, as I understand, "quite a surprising"
twist to most observers.' Before the Italian opinion, and again
when the case reached the European Court, defenders of the
crucifix, including the Italian government, emphasized its
cultural and historical, rather than its specifically religious,
features.' Ultimately the Grand Chamber, while acknowledging
that the crucifix had religious meaning and still permitting its
display, did not affirmatively claim that such displays could
support religious freedom. It merely held that they could coexist
with religious freedom, enough to fall within the margin of
appreciation for European member states.9
As for "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, the U.S.
Supreme Court dodged the question of its constitutionality on a
procedural ground.'0 But the Justices who have signaled their
approval of the phrase have not argued that it makes any
contribution to religious freedom. Instead they have argued that
such references simply "recogni[ze] ... our Nation's religious
history and character";" or that they serve the ceremonial
purposes "of solemnizing public occasions [and] expressing
7 Andrea Pin, Public Schools, the Italian Crucifix, and the European Court of
Human Rights: The Italian Separation of Church and State, 25 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
95, 103 (2011).
8 Id. at 102-03.
' Lautsi v. Italy, No. 30814/06, IT 68, 69 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 18, 2011),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104040.
10 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2004) (parent
who challenged recitation of Pledge in his daughter's classroom lacked standing to
sue because he did not have legal custody over her).
n Id. at 30 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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confidence in the future";1 2 or, in Justice Brennan's view, that the
words "have lost through rote repetition any significant religious
content."13
These defenses by American Justices, at least, range from
uninspiring at best to offensive at worst. Justice Brennan's
defense is most disturbing, suggesting that a symbol is only
permitted because the government's use of it has stripped it of its
religious meaning. In an article a few years ago, I wrote that "[ilf
'under God' should be upheld, there needs to be a better rationale
for doing so, one that does not kill the patient in order to save
it."14 I still believe that.
So is there something more to be said for the official display
of religious symbols? In what way-if any-could religious
expression by the government, including expression through
symbolic displays, actually promote religious liberty? My two
texts present arguments that it could. Let me return to these
texts, which have typically been ignored if not maligned, and
explore what they have to offer.
A. The Transcendent Status and Source of Rights
First, both texts suggest that religious liberty, like other
human rights, is more secure if it stems from a transcendent
source or authority. Thus the Consiglio di Stato says that the
crucifix display-which symbolizes that values such as toleration
and respect for conscience have religious origins and a "full and
complete correspondence with Christian teachings"-thereby
"makes plain the transcendent sources of th[osel values.""
The American congressional report lays out this argument
explicitly. It says that the inclusion of "under God," by assigning
the state a secondary status, communicates "the belief that the
human person is important because he was created by God and
endowed by Him with certain inalienable rights which no civil
12 Id. at 36 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
14 Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance and the Limited State, 8 TEX. REV.
L. & POL. 41, 48-49 (2003). As I note shortly, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a
different rationale from these Justices-one very much like the "limited
government" argument I explore here. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597
F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2010). But no Supreme Court Justice has endorsed it.
'* Lautsi v. Italy, No. 30814/06, 16, at 9 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 18, 2011),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104040
(quoting Consiglio di Stato).
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authority may usurp."' The passage, of course, echoes the
Declaration of Independence's natural rights theory and its
assertion of "self-evident" truths: "that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights" including "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness."" Thus "under God" in the Pledge may communicate
the ideas "that government is a limited institution" and "that the
rights of persons-the 'liberty and justice' guaranteed to all-are
inalienable, stemming from a source higher than the nation or
any other human authority."" The Court of the Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit recently adopted this rationale, referring to the
1954 congressional committee report, in upholding the Pledge's
text against an Establishment Clause challenge. The appellate
panel said:
The words 'under God' were added as a description of 'one
Nation' primarily to reinforce the idea that our nation is
founded upon the concept of a limited government, in stark
contrast to the unlimited power exercised by communist forms
of government. In adding the words 'under God' to the Pledge,
Congress reinforced the belief that our nation was one of
individual liberties granted to the people directly by a higher
power.
In the context of the Pledge, the phrase 'one Nation under
God' constitutes a powerful admission by the government of its
own limitations.19
The Ninth Circuit panel held that under this "limited
government" argument, the Pledge satisfied the Establishment
Clause because its:
purpose and effect ... are that of a predominantly patriotic, not
a religious, exercise. The phrase 'under God' is a recognition of
our Founder's political philosophy that a power greater than the
16 H.R. REP. No. 83-1693, at 1-2 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339,
2340.
" See The Declaration of Independence, UNITED STATES DIsTRICT COURT,
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA, http://www.wvsd.uscourts.gov/outreach/
Declaration.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2013).
's Berg, supra note 14, at 52.
' Newdow, 597 F.3d at 1032, 1036.
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government gives the people their inalienable rights. Thus, the
Pledge is an endorsement of our form of government, not of
religion or any particular sect.20
Recently some scholars have argued why it could matter
greatly that human rights stem from a God-given dignity. In a
short paper, Jeremy Waldron examines a passage from the
Israeli Supreme Court's 2005 opinion on the question whether
the Israeli government could make preventive strikes aimed at
killing members of terrorist organizations in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip.21 The passage, from the majority opinion by Justice
Aharon Barak, stated: "Needless to say, unlawful combatants
are not beyond the law. They are not 'outlaws.' God created
them as well in his image; their human dignity as well is to be
honored; they as well enjoy and are entitled to protection. . . by
customary international law."2 2 Waldron argues that the
assertion that the terrorist is "created in the image of God" adds
a crucial "objective" ground to the claim that he has dignity:
It presents itself as grounded ontologically, not in what we
happen to care about or in what we happen to have committed
ourselves to, but in facts about what humans are actually like,
or-more accurately, what they have been made by the Creator
to be like ... and to command by virtue of the fact of that
likeness treatment as something sacred and inviolable. We are
not just clever animals, and the evil-doers among us are not just
good animals gone bad: [Olur dignity is associated with a
specifically high rank in creation accorded to us by our creator
and reflecting our likeness to Him.23
Waldron continues:
[The] foundational work that imago dei does for dignity is, in
my opinion, indispensable for generating [and adhering to] the
sort of strong moral constraint . .. that we need to override
what would otherwise seem like sensible and compelling
strategies for dealing with outsiders, with our enemies, with
terrorists, with those who can be categorized as 'the worst of the
worst.'
20 Id. at 1037.
Jeremy Waldron, The War on Terror and the Image of God, in LAW AND
RELIGION: NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 556, 556
(2010).
22 Id. at 557 (emphasis added) (quoting HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against
Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr. [2005] (Isr.)).
23 Id. at 560.
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... [Such constraints must come from] something that goes
beyond our attitudes, even beyond 'our' morality, something
commanded from the depths of the pre-political and pre-social
foundation of the being of those we are tempted to treat
[degradingly].24
Michael Perry has similarly argued that the idea of universal
rights rests in the sacredness of all persons: the fact that "the
Other (the outsider, the stranger, the alien), too, no less than
oneself and the members of one's family or of one's tribe or nation
or race or religion, is a 'child' of God-God the creator and
sustainer of the universe." 2 5  Perry, too, doubts that secular
rationales will be adequate to ground human rights solidly in the
face of pressures to subordinate some persons to the needs-
sometimes the most pressing needs-of the state or some group
within it. He argues that it is too contingent to try to base
human dignity on the awe we feel for the human creature, as
Ronald Dworkin tries to do, or on enlightened self-interest.2 6
These grounds will prove inadequate if a person or group is too
despised or despicable to trigger any sense of awe or too
powerless ever to threaten any retaliation or costs for harm.2 7
I will not try here to assess, let alone resolve, the long-
running debate whether human rights norms ultimately require
a theological grounding. It is enough for my purpose to posit that
such a grounding-a transcendent source, higher than any
human authority or imperative-can strengthen the commitment
to human rights. A transcendent source means that the rights
apply to everyone, even those who seem most alien, and that
society must take the utmost care when it treads close to these
rights. Government may want to express this vision of rights
and try to solidify it in the people's minds through statements,
including symbolic displays. "Passive" displays, as the Lautsi
decision calls them, can express this vision without directly
pressuring people to believe or affirm it, which would itself
violate their freedom of belief.
24 Id. at 560-61.
25 MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 17 (1998).
26 Id. at 27-29 (discussing and criticizing RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION:
AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 82-83
(1993)).
27 Id. at 33-34.
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I should, however, pause to register a caveat about Lautsi's
conclusion that students are not pressured or influenced when
the religious symbols are on schoolroom walls.2 8 The U.S.
Supreme Court, at least, has concluded otherwise: It has
repeatedly enforced our no-establishment rule vigorously
concerning classroom practices, on the premise that students are
"impressionable" and that in the classroom, "[t]he State exerts
great authority and coercive power."" A conclusion of non-
coercion would be much more convincing were the symbols placed
in a room where students did not see them every hour of the
school day.
Concepts of transcendent rights and limited government
may play crucial roles not just generally for human rights, but
especially for religious liberty. I will focus on the American
tradition. James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments was perhaps the greatest statement of our
founding era against government interference in religion, and it
begins by asserting that
[i]t is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such
homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him.
This duty is precedent both in order of time and degree of
obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. Before any man can be
considered as a member of Civil Society, he must be considered
as a subject of the Governor of the Universe.30
Likewise, the landmark Virginia Statute for Religious
Liberty, written by Thomas Jefferson, grounds religious freedom
in the premise that "Almighty God hath created the mind free"
and that "all attempts to influence it by temporal punishments or
burdens ... are a departure from the plan of the Holy Author of
our religion, who being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not
to propagate it by coercions on either.""'
28 Lautsi v. Italy, No. 30814/06, 66 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 18, 2011), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104040 (finding "no
evidence before the Court" of such an effect and concluding "it cannot reasonably be
asserted").
29 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987); see also Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (finding that "indirect coercive pressure upon religious
minorities" from classroom prayers, even with formal opt-out process, "is plain").
'0 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,
in RONALD B. FLOWERS, THAT GODLESS COURT?: SUPREmE COURT DECISIONS ON
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS 187, 187 (2d ed. 2005).
2 Thomas Jefferson, An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, in FLOWERS,
supra note 30, at 193, 193.
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Such passages reflect what Professor Steven Smith has
called the "religious justification" for religious freedom.3 2 In this
account, religious duties and callings are of fundamental value
because they relate to an authority above temporal rulers; but
the state cannot enforce the religious duties it believes valid or
prohibit those it believes invalid, because the duties and callings
are only valuable if they are followed voluntarily. America, like
Europe, has seen a lively debate about whether such religious
arguments are legally admissible today to support a distinctive
right of religious freedom; whether other arguments can generate
such a distinctive right; and indeed whether religious freedom
should exist as a distinctive right or simply as an instance of
general freedoms of belief, expression, and association. In that
debate, Smith and others have argued that the religious
justification is necessary to ground a vigorous right of religious
freedom.3 4 Smith explores several common secular justifications
for religious freedom-respecting personal autonomy, preventing
civil strife, avoiding alienation of some citizens-and concludes
they are inadequate for the task because religion does not
present significantly greater problems than other beliefs on those
measures. 35 Only a religious perspective, Smith says, can explain
why religious freedom is a distinctive right: It does so by
explaining why religious duties and callings are distinctively
important, but must be freely chosen.36 The state acts cautiously
in religious matters-it does not impose a religious view on
anyone, and it makes room for citizens to practice their religious
beliefs as much as possible-precisely because it has a religious
sense of the sacredness of these questions and the limits of its
own authority.
I think that freedom of religion can be justified based on
other rationales, but I do think it is weakened by the loss of the
religious rationale. Let me illustrate this with a tale of two U.S.
Supreme Court decisions, separated by a century. In 1990, the
32 Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional
Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 153-54 (1991).
" Id. at 154-55.
3 See generally JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 112-22 (2000);
Michael S. Paulsen, The Priority of God (A Theory of Religious Liberty), 39 PEPP. L.
REV. 1159 (2013).
3 Smith, supra note 32, at 196, 202, 207, 210, 218.
36 Id. at 155-56.
37 Id. at 155.
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Court ruled in Employment Division v. Smith, the "peyote case,"
that the Free Exercise Clause did not protect religious conduct
from generally applicable laws, no matter the magnitude of the
restriction on religion or the weakness of the state's interest.3 8
This significantly shrunk the scope of constitutional protection
for religious freedom that had existed since 1963."1 As Steven
Smith has shown, the Court's move can be attributed to an
unwillingness to consider the religious justification for religious
freedom. When a religious believer makes a claim for protection
against generally applicable secular laws, she typically calls on
the state to recognize the priority, or at least the importance, of
religious duties. The believer asserts that she faces a conflict
between two authorities, God and the state, and that the state
should allow her to follow the religious duty unless it would
endanger important social interests. But the opinion in the
peyote case denigrated the free exercise claimant as simply
seeking "to become a law unto himself"40 -when in fact, as
Professor Smith observes, "the whole point of the claim is that
the believer is bound by a heteronomous obligation imposed by a
higher authority."4 1 And "[iif there is no higher authority-or at
least none that the state is permitted to recognize-then
regardless of how the claimant characterizes his belief, the
source of the obligation invoked by the believer can only be the
individual himself."42 Once the religious-freedom claim is
reduced to an individual's asserted right to ignore "generally
applicable laws" simply because of his or her subjective belief, the
claim, unsurprisingly, fails.43
Contrast Smith with the Supreme Court's 1892 decision in
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, in which the Justices
refused to apply United States immigration law to prohibit an
Anglican church in New York City from calling an English citizen
38 494 U.S. 872, 906-07 (1990).
39 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-35 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 410 (1963). Both cases recognized constitutionally mandated exemptions
from laws substantially burdening religious freedom unless the state could show a
compelling interest.
40 Emp't Div., 494 U.S. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
167 (1878)).
41 Smith, supra note 32, at 236.
41 Id. at 237.
43 Id. at 234, 236-37.
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as its rector. 44 The Court's opinion is famous-infamous among
civil-rights proponents-because it baldly stated that "this is a
Christian nation."45  Today conservative Christians sometimes
quote that phrase as a reason for the government to disfavor or
impose on non-Christian faiths. But the Court in 1892 used the
phrase entirely differently. After listing in six full pages the
"mass of organic utterances"-colonial and state constitutions,
court rulings, and so forth-"that this is a Christian nation," the
Court concluded that "[i]n the face of all these," it could not be
believed that Congress intended to prohibit "a church of this
country [from] contract[ing] for the services of a Christian
minister residing in another nation."" But the ruling was not
limited to Christian churches: The Court said that "no purpose
of action against religion can be imputed to any legislation, state
or national, because this is a religious people."4 7 And posing a
series of hypothetical questions, it said that if a congressman had
explicitly proposed prohibiting contracts various Christian
denominations made with foreign clergy, "or any Jewish
synagogue with some eminent rabbi," it would not "have received
a minute of approving thought or a single vote."48
In the view of the Court in Holy Trinity Church, the
Christian foundations of the nation generated a respect for
freedom of religious practice that extended to other faiths as well,
even in the face of a secular law that otherwise would clearly
apply. The result contrasts with the peyote decision. And it
should counsel caution to anyone who assumes that a religious
grounding for laws would deny freedom to those of other faiths.
On the contrary, it is plausible that a government willing to
recognize religion in its own expression is more likely to respect
citizens' varying senses of calling to a higher power-even senses
that differ from the majority's-than is a studiously secular
government.
- 143 U.S. 457, 458-59 (1892).
41 Id. at 471.
4 Id.
4 Id. at 465 (emphasis added).
48 Id. at 472 (emphasis added).
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B. Religious Liberty in Public Settings
Second, official religious expression may bolster religious
freedom by affirming, if only symbolically, that religious beliefs
are relevant to public life: that the public square is not naked of
religion, and that religious arguments are part of the pattern of
debate in a pluralistic society. In the words of the Consgilio di
Stato, "the autonomy of the temporal ... [and] spiritual power[s]"
does not equate with an "interpretation of secularism" that
renders spiritual matters irrelevant to the temporal sphere."9
Religious identity is important enough to individuals and
organizations, this view implies, that the freedom to pursue it
extends to all aspects of life, not merely to private, insular
activities, or in other words, those activities that do not touch
others. This is an important matter. Some of today's major
disputes over religious freedom involve whether religious
believers can pursue their beliefs in settings that are not purely
private but that also do not make the believers arms of the state.
Consider the European debate over the non-face-covering
headscarf. As a general matter, nations that rest religious
freedom on a highly secular rationale have been unsympathetic
to the basic claims of citizens to manifest their belief in state
schools in a non-coercive manner. It is questionable enough to
forbid a teacher to wear the headscarf in the classroom-as
Switzerland and some German regions have done 50-but at least
that prohibition rests on a colorable concern that teachers might
influence students subtly or overtly. It is a giant further step
against religious freedom to prohibit students, as France and
Turkey have done, from wearing the scarf or indeed any
conspicuous religious symbol or dress. 1 The concept of the
4 See Lautsi v. Italy, No. 30814/06, 16, at 9 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 18, 2011),
available at httpJ/hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104040.
'o See, e.g., Dahlab v. Switzerland, No. 42393/98, at 13 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 15,
2001), available at httpi/hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-22643
(upholding Swiss law); Germany: Headscarf Bans Violate Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Feb. 26, 2009), available at http-//www.hrw.org/news/2009/02/26/germany-
headscarf-bans-violate-rights ("Half of Germany's 16 states ... have laws
prohibiting public school teachers (and other civil servants in several states) from
wearing the headscarf at work.").
"' Admittedly, even laicitd does not forbid all manifestation of religion in public;
"the principle is primarily aimed at the state and its institutions." Gerhard van der
Schyff & Adriaan Overbeeke, Exercising Religious Freedom in the Public Space: A
Comparative and European Convention Analysis of General Burqa Bans, 7 EUR.
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highly secular state contributes to such bans.52 If secularization
of public activities constitutes the dominant value, with no
qualification, it will constrict the freedom of individuals to
manifest their faith in such settings.
By contrast, French Catholic schools permit the wearing of
the headscarf, leading many French Muslims to turn to the
Catholic system. "It's ironic," one Muslim leader is quoted as
saying, "but today the Catholic Church is more tolerant of-and
knowledgeable about-Islam than the French state." Likewise,
America's understanding of religious freedom, because it is less
secularist than France's, would almost certainly forbid public
schools from singling out peaceful student religious expression
for prohibition.54 And Italy, which displays the crucifix in
classrooms, also, as the Lautsi decision describes, "opens up the
school environment in parallel to other religions" by allowing
students to wear Islamic headscarves or other religious apparel,
by making "alternative arrangements" for students whose "non-
majority religious practices" conflict with school schedules, and
by permitting "optional religious education" to be organized in
schools for "'all recognised religious creeds.' "
The freedom to practice religion beyond insular, private
settings has also been implicated in the American debate over
whether religious charities may be compelled to pay for
contraception and sterilization in their employees' insurance
plans under the 2010 healthcare reform law.6 The Obama
CONST. L. REV. 424, 430 (2011). But state institutions, especially state schools, can
structure much of an individual's life.
5 This is not to deny that other factors have played a role. For comprehensive
discussion, see generally JOHN R. BOWEN, WHY THE FRENCH DON'T LIKE
HEADSCARVES: ISLAM, THE STATE, AND PUBLIC SPACE (2008). See also Robert A.
Kahn, The Headscarf as Threat: A Comparison of German and U.S. Legal
Discourses, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 417, 418-19 (2007).
5' Katrin Bennhold, Spurning Secularism, Many French Muslims Find Haven in
Catholic Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, at A6.
* See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 120 (2001)
(holding that elementary school's act of singling out religious club for exclusion from
after-hours use of classrooms violated First Amendment); Steve Barnes, Oklahoma:
School District Settles Suit Over Muslim Head Scarf, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at
A20 (describing school district's retreat from banning headscarf worn by female
Muslim student).
56 Lautsi v. Italy, No. 30814/06, 74, at 30 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 18, 2011),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104040.
56 News Release, U.S. Dep't. of Health & Human Serv., Affordable Care Act
Ensures Women Receive Preventive Serv. at No Additional Cost, (Aug. 1, 2011),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/08/20110801b.html.
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administration offered a strikingly narrow exemption for
religious organizations with objections to supporting these
procedures and medicines. To be protected, a religious
organization not only had to limit employment primarily to
members of its own faith, but also had to limit its service
primarily to its own members and had to have the primary
purpose of inculcating religious values, that is preaching or
proselytizing, rather than simply serving people. The
administration has recently broadened the exemption by
providing an accommodation for most religious schools, social
services, and hospitals, under which the costs of coverage will be
borne by the insurance company." This has satisfied some
objectors but left many others unsatisfied.
The initial exemption covered few organizations other than
houses of worship: It left vast numbers of religious charities
unprotected, despite their deep religious motivation, simply
because they choose to serve people outside their own religious
body's membership. In the heated public debate over the
mandate, a reproductive rights organization dismissed such
charities as "so-called 'religious'" organizations; the New York
Times called them "nonreligious arms" of the Church.59  The
controversy has implicated many issues, but one of them is
whether a religious organization's right to follow its tenets
should disappear as soon as it enters the realm of providing
services to those outside its religious community. In other words,
does our conception of religious freedom treat action in civil
society as near the periphery of religious practice or as within its
core?
If religion legitimately has public, social relevance, then
citizens should remain free to manifest their religious identity
when they attend state institutions, and religious organizations
should remain free to conform to their moral identity when they
7 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B) (2011).
1 See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act,
78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,873-78 (July 2, 2013) [hereinafter Final Rules] (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pts. 2510, 2590, 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 156),
available at https://webapps.dol.gov/federalregister/PdfDisplay.aspx?DocId=26927;
Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed.
Reg. 8456 (proposed Feb. 6, 2013) [hereinafter Proposed Rules].
59 EMILY's List, Urgent: Stop the Attacks on Birth Control, CARE2.COM,
http://www.thepetitionsite.com/takeaction/124/733/626/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2013);
Editorial, The Freedom to Choose Birth Control, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 11, 2012, at A20.
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provide services to others outside their faith. But if religion
should be a "private," insular matter, then religious freedom
should be narrower and these claims probably should fail. The
Obama Administration's most recent proposal purports to
accommodate religiously affiliated service organizations by
putting the financial and other burden of coverage entirely on the
insurance company, through a separate policy with the
employee-a gambit which may succeed in insulating the
objecting employer from involvement." At least, however, the
proposal now extends fuller protection to some schools and social
services-those that are part of, or an "integrated auxiliary" of, a
church or association of churches-and removes the especially
objectionable language excluding organizations because they
reach non-adherents or because they provide services to people
rather than preach or proselytize." The latest proposal certainly
does not solve all the problems. But here is an optimistic
reading: In the United States, even an administration drawing
much of its support from the secular left recognizes that religious
liberty protection should extend to religiously affiliated service
organizations, not just to houses of worship. America is in the
middle of a struggle over whether the freedom to act on religious
belief should be confined to the most insular settings or should
extend to the provision of services in the broader society. But so
far neither side in that struggle has prevailed.
Religious displays in state settings have a symbolic bearing
on this debate about the scope of religious freedom. Such
displays are one way of communicating the public relevance of
religion and by extension the right of all believers, including
religious minorities, to exercise their faith in public settings.
Thus there is logic and principle at work, not merely
pragmatism, when a nation like Italy displays the crucifix in
state schools while broadly accommodating the needs of Muslims
and other minority faiths in those very same schools.
6 See Final Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,873-78. For an example of immediate
critical reaction, see Press Release, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Final
HHS Rule Fails To Protect Constitutional Rights of Villions of Americans (June 28,
2013), available at httpJ/www.becketfund.org/becket-welcomes-opportunity-to-
study-final-rule-on-hhs-mandate/ and Press Release, The Becket Fund for Religious
Liberty, Still Unacceptable and Unconstitutional (Feb. 1, 2013), available at
http//www.becketfund.org/hhsannouncementl/.
61 Final Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,874; Proposed Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 8461.
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C. Resonance with Societal Values
The arguments so far, of course, do not show that official
acknowledgments of religion ensure strong religious freedom.
Plenty of governments, historical and current, that have
explicitly acknowledged religion or a particular faith have also
constrained or suppressed dissenting views. Many Muslim-
majority states severely limit non-Muslim practices; the Greek
and Russian governments have prohibited even peaceful
religious proselytizing in the name of protecting the Orthodox
faith of citizens." My point is only that official religious symbols
can reflect and reinforce an attitude sympathetic to religious
freedom.
More importantly, in some nations, religious principles
provide the only viable pathway to vigorous religious freedom,
because only that pathway resonates with the population's
traditions or current values. In most Muslim-majority nations,
constitutions will reflect an Islamic foundation; instituting
vigorous religious freedom requires developing and solidifying an
Islamic theory supporting that freedom.6 3 In the United States,
where fifty percent of the population say religion is very
important to them and more than ninety percent believe in God
or a universal spirit,6 4 religious principles will likely remain
important in justifying religious freedom but not necessarily
dominant. Although much of Western Europe has low rates of
religious identification, the fact that ninety-four percent of
62 Laurie Goodstein, Church Battle Over Mandate Was at Ready, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 10, 2012, at Al (observing that the Greek and Russion Orthodox Churches have
joined the American Bishops in calling out their governments for "declar[ing] a war
on religion").
6 See Noah Feldman, A New Democracy, Enshrined in Faith, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
13, 2003, at A31 ("It would be [] futile for the United States to unilaterally impose
secularization in Afghanistan and Iraq. For a constitution to function, it must
represent the will of its citizens. Nothing could delegitimize a constitution more
quickly than America setting down secularist red lines in a well-meaning show of
neo-imperialism. Rather, our goal must be to persuade a majority of the world's 1.2
billion Muslims that Islam and democracy are perfectly compatible.").
6 PEW GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, THE AMERICAN-
WESTERN EUROPEAN VALUES GAP 8 (2011), available at http:/www.pewglobal.org/
files/2011/11/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Values-Report-FINAL-November-17-2011-10AM-
EST1.pdf; Frank Newport, More Than 9 in 10 Americans Continue To Believe in
God, GALLUP POLL (June 3, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/147887/Americans-
Continue-Believe-God.aspx.
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Italians still believe in God or some sort of spirit or life force-
versus only fifty-four percent of the French 6 5-may explain why
support for crucifixes in Italian schools was so high.
Suppose we grant that state-sponsored religious symbols can
send messages that support a vigorous right of religious liberty
for all: the transcendent source of the right, and its relevance in
public as well as private settings. If so, then what is the answer
to this panel's question: Are these messages of state-sponsored
religious symbols cultural or religious? As both Lautsi and
United States Supreme Court opinions recognize, such displays
can communicate religious, cultural, or historical messages, or
combinations of them, depending on the context.6 6 The messages
I have been discussing, I think, are both theological and civil-
cultural. They are certainly civil in that they deal with the civil
implications of religion rather than with purely doctrinal or
liturgical questions. At the same time, the messages are
theological in that they assert that religious freedom and other
human rights have a foundation in objective truths about the
human person and the world: They are not simply constructs of
a particular society or culture, or as some philosophers have put
it, "the way we do things around here."67 And yet the messages
from public religious symbols still have a cultural and historical
component, in that they do not necessarily assert that
Christianity or theism offer the only way to defend the
transcendence and importance of religious freedom. They only
imply that Christianity or religion does support and strengthen
65 EUROBAROMETER 73.1, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, BIOTECHNOLOGY (Oct. 2010)
available at http://ec.europa.eu/public-opinion/archives/ebs/ebs-341_en.pdf. In a
survey of European attitudes on values and biotechnology, 74 percent of Italians
said they believed specifically in God, versus 27 percent of French; and 40 percent of
French were atheists, the highest figure for any European nation. Id.
6 Lautsi v. Italy, No. 30814/06, 16, at 8-9 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 18, 2011),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104040; Van
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 701 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("In certain
contexts, a display of the tablets of the Ten Commandments can convey not simply a
religious message but also a secular moral message (about proper standards of social
conduct). And in certain contexts, a display of the tablets can also convey a historical
message (about a historic relation between those standards and the law ... )
67 See, e.g., MICHAEL BACON & RICHARD RORTY: PRAGMATISM AND POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 38 (2007); Jeremy Waldron, Particular Values and Critical Morality, 77
CAL. L. REV. 561, 583 (1989) (referring to "'the' particular morality of this country or
the way 'we' do things around here").
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religious freedom and that it has been particularly influential in
this culture. But that leaves open the possibility of other
cultures taking other routes.
Thus, in theory, official religious symbols can promote
vigorous religious freedom for all faiths, by suggesting that there
are matters and callings higher than government's authority,
and also that these matters are not purely private and insular
but have some relevance to public life. If religious symbols can
reinforce these notions, then government has reasons to display
them, when the constitutional or human rights tradition of the
relevant nation or group of nations provides room for such official
religious expressions. The broad European approach to church
and state does leave such room. As the Grand Chamber of the
European Court stated in Lautsi, "the fact that there is no
European consensus on the question of the presence of religious
symbols in State schools" supports finding the decision to be
within the margin of appreciation for member states. 8 Indeed,
as Professor Joseph Weiler observed in his argument to the
Grand Chamber, leaving room for governments to incorporate
official religious expressions-as long as they still protect
dissenters' freedom of belief and practice-can actually promote
religious freedom around the world by "[demonstrating] to
countries which believe that democracy would require them to
shed their religious identity that this is not the case.""
If government is going to display religious symbols, it should
make this "religious freedom" rationale for them clear. Because
such symbols are subject to many interpretations, it is important
that the government explain that their display is meant not to
disrespect other faiths or nonbelievers, but rather to symbolize
(a) that freedoms have a transcendent grounding and (b) that
religious freedom does not rest on a secularism that confines
religion to private, insular contexts.
68 Lautsi, No. 30814/06, 1 70.
69 Joseph Weiler, Oral Submission by Professor Joseph Weiler Before the Grand
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, ILSUSSIDIARIO, para. 19, (June
30, 2010), http://www.ilsussidiario.net/News/Politics-Society/2010/7/1/EXCLUSIVE-
Oral-Submission-by-Professor-Joseph-Weiler-before-the-Grand-Chamber-of-the-
European-Court-of-Human-Rights/96909/.
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II. PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
In theory, official religious symbols can support vigorous
religious freedom for all as just described. But in practice, they
may fail to serve these goals or do so at too great a cost. This
section considers two objections: First, that state-chosen symbols
dilute or distort religious meaning; and second, that they exclude
people outside the chosen faith(s). These are essentially the
classic objections that are raised against a state-established
church, or against a civil religion, even when the state in
question gives freedom to other faiths. This section examines
these problems and suggests that, even granting that official
religious symbols can serve valuable goals, those goals may and
often should be achieved by other means.
A. Diluting, Distorting, or Corrupting Religious Meaning
One classic objection to a state-established church or civil
religion is that such arrangements involve the government
pronouncing on matters of religious doctrine. Even if such
pronouncements do not restrict anyone's religious practice, they
can create social division and distort or dilute the meaning of
religious doctrine compared with what the religious communities
in question believe. The United States in particular has
traditionally been concerned that explicit government
pronouncements will corrupt or harm even the religion that the
government seeks to help. The tradition dates back to Roger
Williams and to the Baptist dissenters of the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries who gave crucial impetus to
disestablishment in the American states.7 0 It is impossible to
imagine a modern American court engaging in anything close to
the detailed interpretation of Christianity that the Italian courts
offered in Lautsi.
An obvious distortion or dilution of religion occurs if courts
validate religious symbolic displays on the ground-adopted by
some U.S. Supreme Court Justices-that the displays have no
religious meaning or serve merely a historical or ceremonial
70 See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State
Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1524-25 (2004).
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function." But the European Court did not say that in Lautsi,
and the Italian courts clearly recognized the religious meaning of
the crucifix.
The more troubling fact in Lautsi is that the Italian courts
offered a selective and contestable interpretation of Christianity
that, they said, served as the ground for religious freedom and
laicita. For example, the initial court, the Administrative
Tribunal, asserted that despite the history of "'the Inquisition,
Antisemitism, and the crusades, one can easily find the
principle[s] of human dignity, tolerance, and freedom-including
religious freedom-that are part of the same fabric of the State's
laicitAi.' "" The tribunal opined that alone among the world's
religions, Christianity "properly understood" cannot exclude any
nonbelievers, because "[iun Christianity even the faith in an
omniscient god is secondary in relation to charity, meaning
respect for one's fellow human beings."73 The tribunal not only
transposed the order of the two great commandments: loving God
(biblically "the greatest and the first commandment") and loving
neighbor." In addition, by arguably "underestimat[ing] some
painful episodes of the [Christian] past," the tribunal may have
provoked unnecessary irritation and division." Government
pronouncements on religious disputes are prone to do just that.
However, the problem with this objection is that it may
prove too much: Any government expression of religious content
could be seen by someone as a mistake or distortion. Taken to its
logical conclusion, the principle of "no pronouncements on
religious disputes" means the government cannot display any
religious symbols anywhere or engage in any kind of religious
expression. Even the U.S. Supreme Court, for all its stated
emphasis on government religious neutrality, has not gone that
far. Rather, the Court has claimed both to forbid
pronouncements on religious disputes and to allow some
government religious expression-and it has never offered a
coherent resolution of those two conflicting norms.
7 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
72 Pin, supra note 7, at 104.
7 Lautsi, No. 30814/06, T[ 15, at 7 (citations omitted).
74 Matthew 22:37-39 (New Amer. Bible) ("You shall love the Lord, your God,
with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind. This is the
greatest and the first commandment. The second is like it: You shall love your
neighbor as yourself." (citations omitted)).
75 Pin, supra note 7, at 104.
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Any nation that states a commitment to religious
neutrality-which includes Italy as well as the United States-
faces a problem reconciling that commitment with longstanding
traditions of government religious expression. But the problem
seems to me more acute in the United States, which has an
explicit non-establishment provision and where the Supreme
Court has committed itself so strenuously to neutrality, than in
Europe. If disestablishment is not a fundamental principle-and
throughout much of Europe it is not-then there is more room to
read neutrality in a flexible rather than absolute sense. Under
the flexible approach, government may express religious
messages, and therefore shape religious ideas, as long as it
recognizes equal, substantial religious freedom for people of all
views on religion.
B. The Problem of Excluding Others
A more serious problem with official sponsorship of religious
symbols is that, even if it does not directly undercut anyone's
religious freedom, it may alienate citizens who do not belong to
the favored faith. Even if such a symbol supports the importance
of religious freedom for all faiths, the fact that the symbol
belongs to only one faith may also communicate a message of
favoritism that creates social division." Even the Italian
Administrative Tribunal recognized that "[tihe logical
mechanism of exclusion of the unbeliever is inherent in any
religious conviction, even if those concerned are not aware of it,"n
and it gave no good reason for refusing to apply this insight to
Christianity as well. In this final section, therefore, I consider
whether and how to take steps to reduce this exclusion while
retaining and serving the important principles that religious
symbols, in theory, can promote: the transcendent source of
religious freedom and its relevance in public and not merely
private, insular settings.
76 See Alessandro Ferrari, Civil Religion in Italy: A "Mission Impossible"?, 41
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 839, 853 (2010) ("The logical consequence of [the Italian
courts'] rationale [in Lautsi] is an interpretation of Italian religious freedom based
on the idea of a privileged treatment of religious convictions over non-religious
ones ... and based on a clear superiority of the Catholic Church. In the crucifix
controversies, the judges completely ignore the first paragraph of Article 8, which
foresees equal freedom for all cults." (citation omitted)).
7 Lautsi, No. 30814/06, $[ 15, at 7.
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1. Excluding Other Faiths
If an official display reflects one faith, as do the crucifixes in
Italian schools, one might expand the display to encompass a
wide range of faiths. There are two strategies for accomplishing
this. One, prevalent in America, is to promote a so-called non-
sectarian or common faith. Much religious expression by
American governments has very general religious content that
aims to include the large majority of religious beliefs and
believers by abstracting away from differences among them.
"Under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance constitutes a classic
example, aimed at encompassing Protestants, Catholics, and
Jews, the three groups thought to define America's religious
diversity in the 1950s." Other examples include generalized
prayers to God in open legislative or court sessions and displays
of the Ten Commandments on government property.79 The
defense of such practices, in the words of Justice Scalia, is that
they "are recognized across such a broad and diverse range of the
population-from Christians to Muslims-that they cannot be
reasonably understood as a government endorsement of a
particular religious viewpoint."8 0  I suspect that this approach
has weaker historical roots and less appeal in Europe than
America. It also may fail to satisfy not just the non-religious
citizen, but the highly particularistic religious believer who
objects to the reduction of her faith to a least common
denominator.
The other option is to display the different symbols of
multiple faiths. This avoids the problems of reductionism and
abstraction, but it may raise practical problems in ensuring that
all relevant faiths are included. More importantly, it does not
remedy the potential alienation or exclusion of persons who do
not adhere to any religion.
78 See, e.g., WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT, CATHOLIC, JEW: AN ESSAY IN
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY 87-90 (1955) (describing the "common faith" of
1950s America).
79 See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1983) (upholding practice
of non-sectarian legislative prayers).
80 McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 894 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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2. Excluding Nonbelievers
Even granting that officially endorsed religious symbols can
support a wholesome attitude toward religious liberty, they also
can have a direct, immediate negative effect on nonbelievers.
Symbols might communicate messages supporting toleration for
atheists and skeptics, but they might communicate messages of
disfavor or exclusion. And whatever direct effect they have on
the freedom of individuals, they can cause resentment and social
conflict. Therefore the government may be wise to forego
displaying such symbols unless the potential benefits in religious
freedom are quite certain and cannot be achieved by other
means.
In fact, displays of religious symbols can undercut vigorous
protection of the right to practice religion, by undercutting
arguments for reciprocity in protection of rights. Strong
protection of free exercise, encompassing exemptions from
generally applicable secular laws, creates costs to other social
goals and can be expected to trigger resistance, increasingly so as
a society becomes more secular. In those circumstances, freedom
of religious practice may not succeed unless its defenders can
make arguments from reciprocity. In other words, only if
proponents of religious practice give significant weight to
nonbelievers' interests, and relinquish whatever benefits a state-
sponsored symbol provides, can they successfully claim
significant weight also for the freedom to engage in religious
practice. Put conversely, in positive terms: If nonbelievers'
interests receive sufficient weight to eliminate even state
displays that do not directly coerce them, then freedom of
religious practice also deserves sufficient weight to justify
incurring significant social costs to protect it.
C. Religious Freedom in Public Settings, Without State-
Sponsored Displays
In short, the key is that the state somehow acknowledge its
limits and respect the right of people to practice their religious
beliefs in civil society, not just insular private settings. Official
religious symbols might support such respect, but they might
also interfere with it. If official religious symbols are eliminated
or forbidden, it should be because they create such interference,
not because they violate the norm of a strictly secular public
sphere.
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Moreover, if religious symbols are eliminated, it is then
important to make clear that this does not constitute an
endorsement of secularism, particularly in education. Here are
two ways of doing so.
1. Teaching About the Relevance of Religion
Although the religious rationales for religious freedom and
other human rights are undoubtedly important, government has
means to expose students to these rationales without official
displays of religious symbols. A school can teach about the
religious rationales by presenting them in an objective rather
than a devotional manner. It can teach children that historically,
and for many citizens today, religious freedom and other rights
have rested on belief in God-which is different from teaching
children that they should believe in God. A non-devotional but
fair presentation of religious propositions may inform students
far more than any displays can. As Professor Weiler pointed out
in his argument to the Grand Chamber, "a crucifix on the wall,
might be perceived as coercive. .. . [Ilt depends on the curriculum
to contextualize and teach the children in the Italian class
tolerance and pluralism.""' Done properly, such teaching does
not violate anyone's freedom to practice religion or educate his
children in conformity with his beliefs. To paraphrase Lautsi,
such teaching does not have a "proselytizing tendency," nor is it
"intolerant of pupils who believe [ ] in other religions, [who are]
non-believers or who [hold] non-religious philosophical
convictions."82
2. Freedom of Individuals
The display of religious symbols may be a way for the state
to acknowledge limits on its power and the possibility of a
transcendent reality. But in choosing the symbols, the state may
inevitably end up defining and confining that transcendent
reality rather than simply acknowledging it. If this effect is
inevitable, then the only way for the state to acknowledge its
limits is by remaining silent and leaving statements about
transcendent reality to the initiative of private individuals and
groups in civil society. If the state can only acknowledge a higher
* Weiler, supra note 69.
2 Lautsi, No. 30814/06, 1 74.
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reality by acknowledging the various higher commitments of its
various citizens, that fact implies that the state should
accommodate conscientious religious practice in cases of conflict
with the law, unless there is a strong reason for refusing the
accommodation. As Professor Michael McConnell has written,
recognition of such accommodations "makes an important
statement about the limited nature of governmental authority.
While the government is powerless and incompetent to determine
what particular conception of the divine is authoritative," the
right to religious freedom implies "that [government's] claims on
the loyalty and obedience of the citizens is partial and
instrumental," leaving room for "the commands of God, as heard
and understood in the individual conscience.""
State-sponsored religious displays can communicate these
important messages of limited government and transcendent
freedoms, including a religious freedom that is relevant to public
life and not confined to private, insular settings. Still, the official
symbols also come with costs, and government is often well
advised not to display them. But the crucial thing is to cultivate
the spirit I have described of limited government, transcendent
rights, and meaningful religious freedom.
* Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1516 (1990).
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